A Legal Analysis of the 2025 Tanzanian Electoral Process


 


The 2025 electoral cycle in Tanzania serves as a crucial example of the decline of democratic norms, the weakening of institutional protections, and the gap between domestic laws and regional as well as international human rights standards. The events happening from April through the October general elections show a move away from constitutional principles and raise important legal questions about protecting political rights, ensuring access to justice, and maintaining electoral integrity.

The October elections were preceded by a climate marked by arrests, legal restrictions, and institutional decisions that undermined the preconditions for a free and fair vote. The arrest of Tundu Lissu, leader of the main opposition party CHADEMA, on treason charges after calling for electoral reforms signaled the beginning of a broader suppression of political dissent. His proposed reforms—including the independence of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), judicial review of presidential results, revival of constitutional reforms, and mechanisms ensuring majority electoral legitimacy—were central to strengthening democratic compliance.[1]

Following Lissu’s arrest, the INEC banned CHADEMA from participating in any election until 2030, citing refusal to sign the electoral code of conduct. Although framed as a safeguard for peaceful and transparent elections, critics viewed the code as a tool weaponized to consolidate state power and restrict pluralism.[2]

Legal Context and the African Court’s Judgment on Article 41(7)

The legal challenges to the Tanzanian electoral framework, particularly Article 41(7) of the Constitution, were highlighted in the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights judgment delivered in Jebra Kambole v. United Republic of Tanzania. Article 41(7) establishes that once a presidential candidate is declared elected, no court may inquire into that election.[3]

The Applicant argued that Article 41(7) violated the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, specifically: Article 2: Non-discrimination; Article 3(2): Equal protection of the law; Article 7(1)(a): Right to have one’s cause heard.[4]

The Court found that: Article 41(7) creates unequal treatment by preventing judicial scrutiny of presidential results, violating Article 2. Article 3(2) was not violated, as differentiated treatment may be permissible in certain contexts. Article 41(7) violates Article 7(1)(a) by denying access to courts regarding presidential election disputes. Tanzania violated Article 1 of the Charter by failing to adopt legislative measures to give effect to the Charter.[5]

The Court ordered Tanzania to amend Article 41(7), align the Constitution with the Charter, and report on compliance within set timelines. This judgment directly implicated the integrity of the 2025 electoral process, given that the prohibition on judicial oversight remained unaddressed.[6]

Assessment by the African Union Election Observation Mission

At the invitation of the Government and INEC, the African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) assessed the electoral environment from October 14 to November 3, 2025. Guided by AU instruments and international human rights standards, the Mission evaluated compliance with democratic norms and Tanzania’s legal framework.[7]

Key observations included:

Inability to observe elections in some areas due to deadly protests and a six-day internet shutdown.

Restrictions on stakeholder engagement limit transparency.

A diminished political environment due to CHADEMA’s boycott and the disqualification of the ACT-Wazalendo presidential candidate.

 

 Pre-Election Findings: Legal and Political Barriers

A. Political Context[8]

The political landscape was constrained by arrests of opposition leaders, legal prohibitions on political activities, and institutional actions that limited electoral competitiveness. In particular: The banning of CHADEMA.

Disqualification of ACT-Wazalendo’s presidential candidate.

Failure to implement constitutional reforms ordered by the African Court, including review of Article 41(7) and provisions limiting independent candidacy.

These developments contravened Articles 4(1)(2) of the ACDEG and Article 13(1) of the African Charter, which safeguard participation in democratic governance.

B. Legal Framework[9]

While Tanzania’s framework—comprising national constitutions and electoral statutes—provides structural bases for elections, fundamental gaps remain. Article 41(7) and Article 39(1) (prohibiting independent candidates) remain inconsistent with:

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 7)

ICCPR (Article 2(3))

In Zanzibar, although reforms occurred, trust deficits persisted, particularly concerning early voting and the absence of a dedicated voter roll.

 

C. Electoral System and Administration[10]

Tanzania employs a mixed electoral system combining First Past the Post and proportional representation. While this aligns with AU standards, the independence of election administration was undermined by:

Presidential control over INEC appointments.

Inclusion of senior public officers as returning officers.

Delays in releasing the election calendar.

Stakeholder concerns over transparency and registration integrity.

Voter education and registration were implemented, yet concerns arose regarding non-citizen registration in border areas and late accreditation of CSOs.

 

Conclusion

The 2025 Tanzanian elections, when assessed against domestic law, African Charter obligations, and AU governance standards, reveal systemic legal and institutional shortcomings. These include restrictions on political competition, prohibitions on judicial review of presidential results, weaknesses in electoral administration, and unequal access to the electoral process.

The African Court’s judgment underscores the incompatibility of Tanzania’s constitutional provisions with regional human rights obligations. Simultaneously, the findings of the AUEOM highlight persistent legal and structural barriers to the genuine expression of the people’s will.

Taken together, the events described demonstrate a critical decline in Tanzania’s adherence to democratic principles, rule of law, and electoral justice.



[1] Wilfred M. Waimiri, ‘Tanzania’s Reckoning: How Many Died in Post-Election Violence?’, 13 November 2025- https://fronts.co/article/tanzanias-reckoning-how-many-died-in-post-election-violence/ on 25 November 2025

[2] Idem

[3] FB Attorneys, ‘African Court holds Article 41(7) of Constitution violates African Charter’, 28 July 2020- https://lexafrica.com/2020/07/african-court-holds-article-417-of-constitution-violates-african-charter/ on 25 November 2025

[4][4] Idem

[5] Idem

[6] Idem

[7] African Union, ‘Preliminary Statement of the African Union Election Observation Mission to the October 2025 General Elections in The United Republic of Tanzania: The African Union Election Observation Mission calls for urgent constitutional reforms and inclusive politics’,  5 November, 2025-          https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20251105/aueom-preliminary-statement-october-2025-general-elections-tanzania on 25 November 2025  

[8] Idem

[9] Idem

[10] Idem 

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