A Legal Analysis of the 2025 Tanzanian Electoral Process
The
2025 electoral cycle in Tanzania serves as a crucial example of the decline of
democratic norms, the weakening of institutional protections, and the gap
between domestic laws and regional as well as international human rights
standards. The events happening from April through the October general
elections show a move away from constitutional principles and raise important
legal questions about protecting political rights, ensuring access to justice,
and maintaining electoral integrity.
The
October elections were preceded by a climate marked by arrests, legal
restrictions, and institutional decisions that undermined the preconditions for
a free and fair vote. The arrest of Tundu Lissu, leader of the main opposition
party CHADEMA, on treason charges after calling for electoral reforms signaled
the beginning of a broader suppression of political dissent. His proposed
reforms—including the independence of the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC), judicial review of presidential results, revival of
constitutional reforms, and mechanisms ensuring majority electoral
legitimacy—were central to strengthening democratic compliance.[1]
Following
Lissu’s arrest, the INEC banned CHADEMA from participating in any election
until 2030, citing refusal to sign the electoral code of conduct. Although
framed as a safeguard for peaceful and transparent elections, critics viewed
the code as a tool weaponized to consolidate state power and restrict
pluralism.[2]
Legal
Context and the African Court’s Judgment on Article 41(7)
The
legal challenges to the Tanzanian electoral framework, particularly Article
41(7) of the Constitution, were highlighted in the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights judgment delivered in Jebra Kambole v. United Republic of
Tanzania. Article 41(7) establishes that once a presidential candidate is
declared elected, no court may inquire into that election.[3]
The
Applicant argued that Article 41(7) violated the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, specifically: Article 2: Non-discrimination; Article 3(2):
Equal protection of the law; Article 7(1)(a): Right to have one’s cause heard.[4]
The
Court found that: Article 41(7) creates unequal treatment by preventing
judicial scrutiny of presidential results, violating Article 2. Article 3(2)
was not violated, as differentiated treatment may be permissible in certain
contexts. Article 41(7) violates Article 7(1)(a) by denying access to courts
regarding presidential election disputes. Tanzania violated Article 1 of the
Charter by failing to adopt legislative measures to give effect to the Charter.[5]
The
Court ordered Tanzania to amend Article 41(7), align the Constitution with the
Charter, and report on compliance within set timelines. This judgment directly
implicated the integrity of the 2025 electoral process, given that the
prohibition on judicial oversight remained unaddressed.[6]
Assessment
by the African Union Election Observation Mission
At
the invitation of the Government and INEC, the African Union Election
Observation Mission (AUEOM) assessed the electoral environment from October 14
to November 3, 2025. Guided by AU instruments and international human rights
standards, the Mission evaluated compliance with democratic norms and
Tanzania’s legal framework.[7]
Key
observations included:
Inability
to observe elections in some areas due to deadly protests and a six-day
internet shutdown.
Restrictions
on stakeholder engagement limit transparency.
A
diminished political environment due to CHADEMA’s boycott and the
disqualification of the ACT-Wazalendo presidential candidate.
Pre-Election Findings: Legal and Political
Barriers
A.
Political Context[8]
The
political landscape was constrained by arrests of opposition leaders, legal
prohibitions on political activities, and institutional actions that limited
electoral competitiveness. In particular: The banning of CHADEMA.
Disqualification
of ACT-Wazalendo’s presidential candidate.
Failure
to implement constitutional reforms ordered by the African Court, including
review of Article 41(7) and provisions limiting independent candidacy.
These
developments contravened Articles 4(1)(2) of the ACDEG and Article 13(1) of the
African Charter, which safeguard participation in democratic governance.
B.
Legal Framework[9]
While
Tanzania’s framework—comprising national constitutions and electoral
statutes—provides structural bases for elections, fundamental gaps remain.
Article 41(7) and Article 39(1) (prohibiting independent candidates) remain
inconsistent with:
African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 7)
ICCPR
(Article 2(3))
In
Zanzibar, although reforms occurred, trust deficits persisted, particularly
concerning early voting and the absence of a dedicated voter roll.
C.
Electoral System and Administration[10]
Tanzania
employs a mixed electoral system combining First Past the Post and proportional
representation. While this aligns with AU standards, the independence of
election administration was undermined by:
Presidential
control over INEC appointments.
Inclusion
of senior public officers as returning officers.
Delays
in releasing the election calendar.
Stakeholder
concerns over transparency and registration integrity.
Voter
education and registration were implemented, yet concerns arose regarding
non-citizen registration in border areas and late accreditation of CSOs.
Conclusion
The
2025 Tanzanian elections, when assessed against domestic law, African Charter
obligations, and AU governance standards, reveal systemic legal and
institutional shortcomings. These include restrictions on political
competition, prohibitions on judicial review of presidential results,
weaknesses in electoral administration, and unequal access to the electoral
process.
The
African Court’s judgment underscores the incompatibility of Tanzania’s
constitutional provisions with regional human rights obligations.
Simultaneously, the findings of the AUEOM highlight persistent legal and
structural barriers to the genuine expression of the people’s will.
Taken
together, the events described demonstrate a critical decline in Tanzania’s
adherence to democratic principles, rule of law, and electoral justice.
[1] Wilfred
M. Waimiri, ‘Tanzania’s Reckoning: How Many Died in Post-Election Violence?’, 13 November 2025- https://fronts.co/article/tanzanias-reckoning-how-many-died-in-post-election-violence/
on 25 November 2025
[2]
Idem
[3] FB
Attorneys, ‘African Court holds Article 41(7) of Constitution violates African
Charter’, 28 July 2020- https://lexafrica.com/2020/07/african-court-holds-article-417-of-constitution-violates-african-charter/
on 25 November 2025
[4][4]
Idem
[5]
Idem
[6]
Idem
[7]
African Union, ‘Preliminary Statement of the African Union Election Observation
Mission to the October 2025 General Elections in The United Republic of
Tanzania: The African Union Election Observation Mission calls for urgent
constitutional reforms and inclusive politics’,
5 November, 2025- https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20251105/aueom-preliminary-statement-october-2025-general-elections-tanzania
on 25 November 2025
[8]
Idem
[9]
Idem
[10]
Idem
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